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F. Aaron Rains 
 
In Solenex LLC v. Jewell, the Secretary of the Interior cancelled a 
highly contentious oil and gas lease in Montana’s Badger-Two Medicine 
area, an environmentally sensitive and culturally significant area to the 
Blackfeet Tribe, nearly thirty years after the lease had been issued. 
Solenex, a Louisiana based oil and gas company and holder of the lease, 
brought this action to enjoin the cancellation. The District Court for the 
District of Columbia agreed with Solenex and found that the Secretary’s 
decision took an unreasonable amount of time and violated good-faith 
contractual obligations. On these grounds, the court found the Secretary’s 
decision arbitrary and capricious and reinstated the lease.   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Solenex LLC v. Jewell, Solenex sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)  against 
the Secretary of the Department of the Interior (“the Secretary”), the 
Secretary of Agriculture, the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”), the 
Chief of the Forest Service, and other federal agencies, to enjoin the 
cancellation of their oil and gas lease.1 Solenex alleged the Secretary 
exceeded her authority because cancellation of the lease was: (1) arbitrary 
and capricious; (2) barred by a statute of limitations; (3) should be 
estopped by the agencie’s longstanding treatment of the lease as valid; and 
(4) the lease was issued in compliance with the National Environmental 
Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the National Historic Preservation Act 
(“NHPA”).2 The court agreed with Solenex and found the Secretary’s 
decision was arbitrary and capricious due to the unreasonable amount of 
time it took to cancel the lease.3 Therefore, the court granted Solenex’s 
motion for summary judgment, denied the Secretary’s cross-motion, and 
effectively reinstated the lease.4  
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In May of 1982, the BLM granted “Lease M-53323” to Solenex’s 
forbearer, Sidney M. Longwell.5 The BLM and the United States Forest 
Service (“Forest Service”) issued the lease after conducting an 
environmental assessment (“1981 EA”) that covered approximately 200 
                                                     
1. Solenex LLC v. Jewell, No. 13-0993, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2018 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 163296, (D.D.C.  Sept. 24, 2018). 
2. Id. at *3-4.  
3. Id.   
4. Id. at *3. 
5. Id. at *8. 
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oil and gas leases in the Badger-Two Medicine.6 The 1981 EA considered 
the environmental impacts of issuing the lease and the potential impacts 
of several proposed alternatives to outright lease issuance.7 During this 
time, the Forest Service also consulted with members of the Blackfeet 
Nation (the “Tribe”) about the proposed leases, as required by the 
American Indian Religious Freedom Act.8 Upon completion of the 1981 
EA, the Forest Service issued a Decision Notice stating that the 1981 EA 
resulted in a Finding of No Significant Impact and that “Alternative 3” had 
been selected.9 Alternative 3 “conditionally granted leases with surface 
occupancy. . . only for accessible areas that could be protected and 
provided that after lease issuance, any proposed oil and gas activities 
would be fully analyzed under NEPA."10 
In 1983, Longwell assigned his lease to Fina, Inc., and in late 1983 
Fina applied for a permit to drill (“APD”).11 In response, the Forest Service 
conducted another EA (“1985 EA”) specifically examining potential 
impacts of the APD.12 The 1985 EA “expressly incorporated” the findings 
from the 1981 EA, which had previously resulted in the issuance of the 
lease itself, and included consultation with other agencies and the Tribe as 
mandated by NEPA and the NHPA.13 Based on the 1985 EA, the Forest 
Service approved Fina’s APD, again finding no significant cultural or 
environmental impacts would result and specifically that the Tribe’s 
reserved rights in the Badger-Two Medicine would not be impeded.14 This 
decision was appealed to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (“the Board”) 
based on perceived inadequate tribal consultation, but the Board upheld 
the approval of the APD and remanded the consultation issue to the agency 
for further consideration.15 Despite the approval of the APD, the BLM 
suspended the lease for further assessment.16 This suspension continued 
for the next twenty years.17  
In 2013, Solenex, now holder of the original Longwell lease, filed 
suit against the Secretary alleging administrative violations of the APA 
related to the suspension of their oil and gas lease.18 The District Court for 
the District of Columbia partially granted Solenex’s motion for summary 
judgment and ordered the Secretary to produce an accelerated schedule of 
                                                     
5. Id.  
7. Id.  
8. Id. *8-9.  
9.  Id. at *9. 
10.  Id. (citing Statement of Material Facts in Support of Pls.' Mot. for 
Summary Judgment).  
11.  Id. Fina submitted an Application for a Permit to Drill (APD).  
12. Id.   
13.  Id.  
14. Id.  
15. Id. at *10.  
16. Id.  
17.  Id.  
18   Id.  
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administrative tasks aimed at resolving the ongoing suspension issue.19 
The Secretary timely produced the schedule but the court found the 
schedule deficient and consequently rejected it.20 Following the court’s 
rejection of the proposed schedule, the Secretary notified the court that it 
intended to terminate the Solenex lease and had initiated the lease 
cancellation process.21  
In March of 2016, the Secretary issued a Notice of Cancellation 
finalizing the termination of the Solenex lease, amongst several others in 
the Badger-Two Medicine, concluding the leases were issued despite 
agency violations of NEPA and the NHPA that had occurred during the 
1981 and 1985 EAs.22 In response, Solenex brought this action challenging 
the cancellation.23   
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
The court found that the Secretary’s cancellation of the Solenex 
lease was arbitrary and capricious and thus a violation of the APA.24 The 
cancellation constituted a ‘final agency action’ as defined by the APA;25 
therefore, in order to determine if summary judgment was warranted, the 
court reviewed whether the Secretary acted “within the scope of [her] 
legal authority, explained [her] decision, ‘relied on record-based facts’, 
and considered relevant factors.”26  
 The parties’ initial disagreement hinged on whether the Secretary 
had the administrative authority to cancel oil and gas leases.27 However, 
the court did not review the Secretary’s authority because it found that 
the case turned instead on its “unique facts.”28 The court found the 
Secretary’s failure to consider Solenex’s contractual reliance interest 
when deciding to cancel the lease after nearly thirty years was arbitrary 
and capricious, and “an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”29  
 The court examined whether the decision was “reasonable or 
reasonably explained.”30 The primary factor in the court’s analysis and 
holding was the nearly thirty years that had elapsed between the issuance 
                                                     
19.  Id. at *10-11.  
20.  Id. at *11.  
21.  Id. 
22.  Id. at *12.  
23.  Id.  
24. Id. at *21.  
25.  Id. at *12.  
26.  Id. (citing Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96, 105 (D.D.C. 
1995)).  
27.  Id. at *13-14.  
28.  Id. at *15.  
29.  Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Rempfer v. Sharfstein, 583 F.3d 860, 
865, 388 U.S. App. D.C. 226 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 
30.  Id. at *16 (citing Ams. for Clean Energy v. EPA, 864 F.3d 691, 726 
(D.C. Cir. 2017)).  
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of the lease and its cancellation.31 Stating that the Secretary’s last-minute 
decision to cancel was owed “no great degree of deference,” the court 
held that thirty years was an unreasonable amount of time to correct the 
agency’s NEPA and NHPA violations, and thus the cancellation violated 
the APA.32 
 The court made this determination by relying in part on the legal 
theory of contract reliance interests and the reconsideration of prior 
agency decisions.33 That is, if an agency grants a party certain interests, 
any agency reconsideration of that decision “must be timely.”34 The court 
found the thirty years the agency spent trying to determine the lawfulness 
of their own actions “[wreaked] havoc on the interests of individual 
leaseholders”35 and strongly dismissed the Secretary’s argument that no 
time period is too long in light of “new legal theories.”36 Therefore, the 
Secretary’s failure to consider Solenex’s reliance interest in the lease was 
deemed “an arbitrary and capricious agency action.”37 
 Next, the court held that the Secretary’s failure to give 
cancellation notice to Solenex violated “basic contractual principles” 
which the federal government is obliged to honor when it executes an oil 
and gas lease with a private party pursuant to the Mineral Leasing Act of 
1920 (“MLA”).38 Specifically, the court found that the Secretary’s failure 
to provide notice of cancellation to Solenex violated its contractual duty 
to act in “good faith.”39 
 Solenex’s additional arguments, which included equitable 
estoppel and a statute of limitations claim, were not addressed by the 
court.40 Additionally, the court did not find it necessary to determine 
whether Solenex was a bona fide purchaser as required for “protection 
purposes” pursuant to the MLA, because these arguments were precluded 
by the Court’s finding that the cancellation was a violation of the APA.41 
  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 It is probable that Solenex relied on the validity of the original 
issuance when acquiring the lease, but it is not apparent if the Court 
analyzed the magnitude of the financial or resource-based detriment 
caused by Solenex’s reliance on the lease. Further, the court declined to 
address the very sensitive cultural and ecological concerns that were the 
                                                     
31.  Id.  
32.  Id. at *17 (citing Texas Oil and Gas Corp. v. Watt, 683 F.2d 427, 431, 
221 U.S. App. D.C. 108 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 
33.  Id. at *18.  
34.  Id. at *18-19. 
35.  Id.  
36.      Id. at *19-20. 
37.  Id. at *20.  
38.  Id.  
39.  Id.  
40. Id.   
41.  Id. at *21.  
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underpinning of the initial lease suspension and led in part to the 
Secretary’s decision to cancel the lease.  
This ruling is a drawback to the protections provided by NEPA 
and the NHPA and has diminished the Secretary’s ability to cancel oil 
and gas leases issued despite agency error, including any error made by 
his or her predecessor.  
Following the court’s reasoning, agency violations of NEPA and 
the NHPA impliedly have an expiration date and the amount of time the 
Secretary takes to reconsider oil and gas leases issued in violation of 
those statutes will be viewed through an arguably arbitrary lens of 
reasonableness.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
